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Abstract
We shall first construct by ordinary recursion method subsets to the set D of Go¨del
numbers of the sentences of a language L. That language is formed by the sentences
of a fully interpreted formal language L, called an MA language, and sentences containing
a monadic predicate letter T . From the class of the constructed subsets ofD we extract one
set U by transfinite recursion method. Interpret those sentences whose Go¨del numbers are
in U as true, and their negations as false. These sentences together form an MA language.
It is a sublanguage of L having L as its sublanguage, and T is its truth predicate.
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1
1 Introduction
In [4] a theory of truth is defined for certain sublanguages of a language L which is the first order
language L = {∈} of set theory augmented by a monadic predicate T . The interpretation of L
is determined by the minimal model M constructed in [2] for ZF set theory. This interpretation
makes L fully interpreted, i.e., its sentences are either true or false. The sublanguages for which
a theory of truth is defined belong to a class of sublanguages of L. Languages of that class are
denoted by LU , where U is a subset of the set D of the Go¨del numbers of sentences of L. The
Go¨del numbers of sentences of LU belong to the set G(U)∪F (U), where the subsets G(U) and
F (U) of D are told to satisfy the following rules (’iff’ abbreviates ’if and only if’):
(r1) If A is a sentence of L, then the Go¨del number #A of A is in G(U) iff A is true in the
interpretation of L, and in F (U) iff A is false in the interpretation of L.
(r2) Let n be a numeral. #T (n) is in G(U) iff n is the numeral ⌈A⌉ of the Go¨del number of a
sentence A of L and #A is in U . #T (n) is in F (U) iff n = ⌈A⌉, where A is a sentence of
L and #[¬A] is in U .
In the next rules (r3)–(r7) A and B denote sentences of L.
(r3) Negation rule: #[¬A] is in G(U) iff #A is in F (U), and in F (U) iff #A is in G(U).
(r4) Disjunction rule: #[A ∨B] is in G(U) iff #A or #B is in G(U), and in F (U) iff #A and
#B are in F (U).
(r5) Conjunction rule: #[A ∧B] is in G(U) iff both #A and #B are in G(U). #[A ∧B] is in
F (U) iff #A or #B is in F (U).
(r6) Implication rule: #[A → B] is in G(U) iff #A is in F (U) or #B is in G(U). #[A → B]
is in F (U) iff #A is in G(U) and #B is in F (U).
(r7) Biconditionality rule: #[A↔ B] is in G(U) iff #A and #B are both in G(U) or both in
F (U), and in F (U) iff #A is in G(U) and #B is in F (U) or #A is in F (U) and #B is in
G(U).
Assuming that the set X of numerals of Go¨del numbers of sentences of L is the intended domain
of discourse for T , the following rules are presented for ∃xT (x) and ∀xT (x):
(r8) #[∃xT (x)] is in G(U) iff #T (n) is in G(U) for some n ∈ X , and #[∃xT (x)] is in F (U) iff
#T (n) is in F (U) for every n ∈ X .
(r9) #[∀xT (x)] is in G(U) iff #T (n) is in G(U) for every n ∈ X , and #[∀xT (x)] is in F (U) iff
#T (n) is in F (U) at least for one n ∈ X .
In [5] the above considerations are extended to the case when the language L is assumed to be
mathematically agreeable (shortly MA). By Chomsky’s definition (cf. [1]) a “language is a set
(finite or infinite) of sentences of finite length, and constructed out of finite sets of symbols”.
Allowing also countable sets of symbols, we say that L is an MA language if it satisfies the
following conditions.
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(i) The syntax of L contains a countable syntax of the first-order predicate logic with equality
(cf., e.g., [6, II.5]), natural numbers in variables and their names, numerals in terms.
(ii) L is fully interpreted.
(iii) Classical truth tables (cf. e.g., [6, p.3]) are valid for the logical connectives ¬, ∨, ∧, → and
↔ of sentences of L.
(iv) Classical rules of truth hold for ∀xP (x) and ∃xP (x) where P is a predicate of L.
Any countable first-order formal language, equipped with a consistent theory interpreted by a
countable model, and containing natural numbers and numerals, is an MA language. A classical
example is the language of arithmetic with its standard model and interpretation.
Basic ingredients in the approach of [5] are:
1. An MA language L (base language).
2. A monadic predicate letter T .
3. The language L, which has sentences of L, T (n), where n is a numeral, ∀xT (x) and ∃xT (x)
as its basic sentences, and which is closed under logical connectives ¬, ∨, ∧, → and ↔.
4. The set D of Go¨del numbers of sentences of L in its fixed Go¨del numbering.
Neither in [4] nor in [5] the sets G(U) and F (U) satisfying rules (r1)–(r9) are shown to exist.
Our main task is to construct sets G(U) and F (U), and prove that they satisfy rules (r1)–(r9),
and the following rules when #[∃x¬T (x)] and #[∀x¬T (x)] are added to basic sentences of L.
(r10) #[∃x¬T (x)] is in G(U) iff #T (n) is in F (U) for some n ∈ X , and #[∃x¬T (x)] is in F (U)
iff #T (n) is in G(U) for every n ∈ X .
(r11) #[∀x¬T (x)] is in G(U) iff #T (n) is in F (U) for every n ∈ X , and #[∀x¬T (x)] is in F (U)
iff #T (n) is in G(U) at least for one n ∈ X .
Because of the recursive construction of sets G(U) we revise proofs given in [4, 5] for properties
of sets G(U) and F (U). Some of them are used in [4, Theorem 4.1] to prove by transfinite
recursion method the existence of consistent fixed points U of G, i.e., subsets U of D which
satisfy U = G(U), and for no sentence A of L the Go¨del numbers of both A and ¬A are in U .
Among them there is the smallest one which is contained in every consistent fixed point of G.
To the smallest consistent fixed point U of G there corresponds a sublanguage L0 of L which has
G(U)∪F (U) as the set of Go¨del numbers of its sentences. As in [4, 5], define an interpretation
for sentences of L0 as follows. A sentence A of L0 is interpreted as true iff its Go¨del number
#A is in G(U), and as false iff #A is in F (U). The so defined theory of truth for L0 is shown
in [4, Theorem 3.1] to conform well with the eight norms presented for theories of truth in [7].
T is called a truth predicate for L0, because T -biconditionality: A ↔ T (⌈A⌉), is shown in [5,
Lemma 4.1] to be true in that interpretation for all sentences A of L0 (T (⌈A⌉) stands for ’A is
true’). L0 is fully interpreted because G(U ] and F (U) are separated by Lemma 4.1.
L is by rule (r1) a sublanguage of L0. Moreover, a sentence A of L is by [5, Lemma 4.2] true,
respectively false, in the interpretation of L if and only if A is true, respectively false, in the
interpretation of L0.
L0 is an MA language. By above results it satisfies properties (i) and (ii). Rules (r1)–(r11) and
the above defined interpretation imply that properties (iii) and (iv) are valid by assuming that
T and ¬T are the only predicates of L0 which are not predicates of L.
Main tools used in proofs are ZF set theory and classical logic.
3
2 Recursive construction of sets G(U)
Let L, T , L and D be as in the Introduction, and let W denote the set of Go¨del numbers of all
those sentences of L which are true in the interpretation of L. Given a subset U of D, denote
D1(U) ={#T (n): n = ⌈A⌉, where A is a sentence of L and #A is in U},
D2(U) ={#[¬T (n)]: n = ⌈A⌉, where A is a sentence of L and #[¬A] is in U}.
(2.1)
We shall construct subsets Gn(U), n ∈ N0, of D recursively as follows.
Define
G0(U) =


W if U = ∅,
W ∪D1(U) ∪ {#[∃xT (x)],#[¬∀x¬T (x)]} if ∅ ⊂ U ⊂ D, and D2(U) = ∅,
W ∪D1(U) ∪D2(U) ∪ {#[∃xT (x)],#[¬∀x¬T (x)]}
∪{#[¬∀xT (x)]#[∃x¬T (x)]} if ∅ ⊂ U ⊂ D, and D2(U) 6= ∅,
W ∪D1(U) ∪D2(U) ∪ {#[∃xT (x)],#[¬∃xT (x)],#[∀xT (x)],#[¬∀xT (x)]}
∪{#[∀x¬T (x)],#[¬∀x¬T (x)],#[∃x¬T (x)]#[¬∃x¬T (x)] if U = D.
(2.2)
Let A and B denote sentences of L. When n ∈ N0, and Gn(U) is defined, denote
G1n(U) ={#[A ∨B] : #A or #B is in Gn(U)},
G2n(U) ={#[A ∧B] : #A and #B are in Gn(U)},
G3n(U) ={#[A→ B] : #[¬A] or #B is in Gn(U)},
G4n(U) ={#[A↔ B] : both #A and #B or both #[¬A] and #[¬B] are in Gn(U)},
G5n(U) ={#[¬(A ∨B)] : #[¬A] and #[¬B] are in Gn(U)},
G6n(U) ={#[¬(A ∧B)] : #[¬A] or #[¬B] is in Gn(U)},
G7n(U) ={#[¬(A→ B)] : #A and #[¬B] are in Gn(U)},
G8n(U) ={#[¬(A↔ B)] : both #A and #[¬B] or both #[¬A] and #B are in Gn(U)},
G9n(U) ={#[¬(¬A)] : #A is in Gn(U)},
(2.3)
and define
Gn+1(U) = Gn(U) ∪
9⋃
k=1
Gkn(U). (2.4)
Because L is closed with respect to connectives ¬, ∨, ∧, → and ↔, it follows from the above
construction that Gn(U) is defined for every n ∈ N0. Moreover, Gn(U) ⊆ Gn+1(U) and G
k
n(U) ⊆
Gkn+1(U) for all n ∈ N0 and k = 1, . . . , 9. In particular, we can define
G(U) =
∞⋃
n=0
Gn(U). (2.5)
Because every set Gn(U) is a subset of D, then also G(U) is contained in D.
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3 Validity of rules (r1)–(r11)
Now we are ready to prove our main result.
Theorem 3.1. Let U be a subset of D, and let the subsets G(U) and F (U) of D be defined by
(2.5), and by
F (U) = {#A : #[¬A] ∈ G(U)}. (3.1)
Then rules (r1)–(r11) are valid.
Proof. Let A be a sentence of L. It follows from the construction of G(U) that #A is in G(U)
iff #A is in W , i.e., iff A is true in the interpretation of L. Definition (3.1) of F (U) implies that
#A is in F (U) iff #[¬A] is in G(U) iff ¬A is true in the interpretation of L. Because L is an
MA language, then ¬A is true in the interpretation of L iff A is false in the interpretation of L.
This proves (r1).
Let n be a numeral. The construction of G(U) implies that #T (n) is in G(U) iff it is in D1(U),
i.e., iff n = ⌈A⌉, where A is a sentence of L and #A is in U . #T (n) is by (3.1) in F (U) iff
#[¬T (n)] is in G(U) iff (by the construction of G(U)) #[¬T (n)] is in D2(U) iff (by the definition
of D2(U)) n = ⌈A⌉, where A is a sentence of L and #[¬A] is in U . This ends the proof of (r2).
In the proof of (r3) we need the following auxiliary result.
(r0) If A is a sentence of L, then #[¬(¬A)] is in G(U) iff #A is in G(U).
Assume first that #[¬(¬A)] is in G0(U). Then #[¬(¬A)] is in W , so that sentence ¬(¬A) is
true in the interpretation of L. Since L is an MA language, then A is true in the interpretation
of L. Thus #A is in W , and hence in G(U).
Assume next that the least of those n for which #[¬(¬A)] is in Gn(U) is > 0. The definition
of Gn(U) implies that if #[¬(¬A)] is in Gn(U), then #[¬(¬A)] is in G
9
n−1(U), so that #A is in
Gn−1(U), and hence in G(U).
Thus #A is in G(U) if #[¬(¬A)] is in Gn(U) for some n ∈ N0, or equivalently, if #[¬(¬A)] is
in G(U).
Conversely, if #A is in G(U), then it is in Gn(U) for some n, so that #[¬(¬A)] is in G
9
n(U),
and hence in Gn+1(U), and thus in G(U). This concludes the proof of (r0).
To prove (r3), let A be a sentence of L. It follows from (3.1) that #[¬A] is in G(U) iff #A is
in F (U). Consider next the case when #[¬A] is in F (U). By (3.1) this holds iff #[¬(¬A)] is in
G(U) iff (by (r0)) #A is in G(U). This ends the proof of (r3).
Let A and B be sentences of L. If #A or #B is in G(U), there is by (2.5) an n ∈ N0 such that
#A or #B is in Gn(U). Thus #[A ∨B] is in G
1
n(U), and hence in G(U).
Conversely, assume that #[A ∨ B] is in G(U). Then there is by (2.5) an n ∈ N0 such that
#[A ∨ B] is in Gn(U). Assume first that n = 0. If #[A ∨ B] is in G0(U), it is in W . Thus
A ∨B is true in the interpretation of L. Because L is an MA language, then A or B is true in
the interpretation of L, i.e., #A or #B is in W , and hence in G(U).
Assume next that the least of those n for which #[A ∨ B] is in Gn(U) is > 0. Then #[A ∨ B]
is in G1n−1(U), so that #A or #B is in Gn−1(U), and hence in G(U).
Consequently, #[A ∨ B] is in G(U) iff #A or #B is in G(U).
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It follows from (3.1) that
(a) #[A ∨B] is in F (U) iff #[¬(A ∨ B)] is in G(U).
If #[¬(A ∨ B)] is in G(U), there is by (2.5) an n ∈ N0 such that #[¬(A ∨ B)] is in Gn(U).
Assume that n = 0. If #[¬(A ∨ B)] is in G0(U), it is in W . Then ¬(A ∨ B) is true in the
interpretation of L, so that (L is an MA language) ¬A and ¬B are true in the interpretation
of L, i.e., #[¬A] and #[¬B] are in W , and hence in G(U).
Assume next that the least of those n for which #[¬(A∨B)] is inGn(U) is> 0. Then #[¬(A∨B)]
is in G5n−1(U), so that #[¬A] and #[¬B] are in Gn−1(U), and hence in G(U). Thus, #[¬A] and
#[¬B] are in G(U) if #[¬(A ∨ B)] is in G(U).
Conversely, if #[¬A] and #[¬B] are in G(U), there exist by (2.5) n1, n2 ∈ N0 such that #[¬A]
is in Gn1(U) and #[¬B] is in Gn2(U). Denoting n = max{n1, n2}, then both #[¬A] and #[¬B]
are in Gn(U). This result and the definition of G
5
n(U) imply that #[¬(A∨B)] is in G
5
n(U), and
hence in G(U). Consequently,
(b) #[¬(A ∨B)] is in G(U) iff #[¬A] and #[¬B] are in G(U) iff (by (3.1)) #A and #B are in
F (U).
Thus, by (a) and (b), #[A ∨ B] is in F (U) iff #A and #B are in F (U). This concludes the
proof of (r4).
The proofs for the validity of rules (r5)–(r7) are similar to that given above for rule (r4).
#[∃xT (x)] is in G(U) iff (by construction of G(U)) #[∃xT (x)] is in G0(U) iff U is nonempty iff
(by (r2)) #T (n) is in G(U) for some numeral n ∈ X .
#[∃xT (x)] is in F (U) iff (by (r3)) #[¬∃xT (x)] is in G(U) iff (by the construction of G(U))
#[¬∃xT (x)] is in G0(U) iff U = D iff (by (r2)) #T (n) is in F (U) for every numeral n ∈ X .
This concludes the proof of (r8).
#[∀xT (x)] is in G(U) iff (by construction of G(U)) #[∀xT (x)] is in G0(U) iff U = D iff (by
(r2)) #T (n) is in G(U) for every numeral n ∈ X .
#[∀xT (x)] is in F (U) iff (by (r3)) #[¬∀xT (x)] is in G(U) iff (by the construction of G(U))
#[¬∀xT (x)] is in G0(U) iff D2(U) is nonempty iff #[¬T (n)] is in G(U) at least for one numeral
n ∈ X iff #T (n) is in F (U) at least for one numeral n ∈ X . This ends the proof of rule (r9).
Similar reasoning as in the above proofs of (r8) and (r9) can be used to verify that rules (r10)
and (r11) are valid.
4 Properties of G(U) and F (U) when U is consistent
In this section we shall prove some properties of G(U) and F (U), where U is consistent. They
are used in [4] to prove the existence of consistent fixed points of G.
Lemma 4.1. Let U be a consistent subset of D. Then G(U) ∩ F (U) = ∅.
Proof. If A is in L, then by rule (r1) #A is not in G(U) ∩ F (U) because L is fully interpreted.
Let n be a numeral. #T (n) is in G0(U) iff it is in D1(U) iff n = ⌈A⌉, where #A is in U . #T (n)
is in F (U) iff #[¬T (n)] is in G(U), or equivalently, in D2(U) iff n = ⌈A⌉, where #[¬A] is in U .
Thus #T (n) cannot be both in G(U) and in F (U), and hence not in G0(U) ∩ F (U), because
the consistency of U implies that #A and #[¬A] cannot be both in U .
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If U is empty, then none of the Go¨del numbers #[∃xT (x)],#[¬∃xT (x)], #[∀xT (x)],#[¬∀xT (x)],
#[∀x¬T (x)],#[¬∀x¬T (x)], #[∃x¬T (x)], and #[¬∃x¬T (x)] is in G0(U). Hence they are not in
G0(U) ∩ F (U).
Assume next that U is not empty. Because U is consistent, it is a proper subset of D. Then
rules (r1), (r8)-(r11), result (r0) and definitions (2.2) and (3.1) imply that not any of the above
listed Go¨del numbers is both in G0(U) and in F (U), and hence in G0(U) ∩ F (U).
The above results and the definition of G0(U) imply that the induction hypothesis:
(h0) Gn(U) ∩ F (U) = ∅
holds for n = 0. If #[A ∨ B] is in G1n(U) ∩ F (U), then #A or #B is in Gn(U), and both #A
and #B are in F (U) by (r4), so that #A or #B is in Gn(U)∩F (U). Hence, if (h0) holds, then
G1n(U) ∩ F (U) = ∅.
#[A ∧ B] cannot be in G2n(U) ∩ F (U), for otherwise both #A and #B are in Gn(U), and at
least one of #A and #B is in F (U), so that #A or #B is in Gn(U)∩F (U), contradicting with
(h0). Thus G2n(U) ∩ F (U) = ∅ if (h0) holds.
If #[A→ B] is in G3n(U) ∩ F (U), then #[¬A] or #B is in Gn(U) and both #[¬A] and #B are
in F (U). But then #[¬A] or #B is in Gn(U) ∩ F (U). Thus G
3
n(U) ∩ F (U) = ∅ if (h0) holds.
If #[A ↔ B] is in G4n(U) ∩ F (U), then both #A and #B or both #[¬A] and #[¬B] are in
Gn(U), and both #[A] and #[¬B] or both #[¬A] and #[B] are in F (U). Then one of Go¨del
numbers #A, #B, #[¬A] and #[¬B] is inGn(U)∩F (U), contradicting with (h0). Consequently,
G4n(U) ∩ F (U) = ∅ if (h0) holds.
If #[¬(A ∨ B)] is in G5n(U) ∩ F (U), then #[¬A] and #[¬B] are in Gn(U), and #[A ∨ B] is in
G(U), i.e., #A or #B is in G(U), or equivalently, #[¬A] or #[¬B] is in F (U). Thus #[¬A] or
#[¬B] is in Gn(U) ∩ F (U). Hence, if (h0) holds, then G
5
n(U) ∩ F (U) = ∅.
If #[¬(A∧B)] is in G6n(U)∩F (U), then #[¬A] or #[¬B] is in Gn(U), and #[A∧B] is in G(U),
or equivalently, #A and #B are in G(U), i.e., #[¬A] and #[¬B] are in F (U). Consequently,
#[¬A] or #[¬B] is in Gn(U) ∩ F (U), contradicting with (h0). Thus G
6
n(U) ∩ F (U) = ∅ if (h0)
holds.
If #[¬(A → B)] is in G7n(U) ∩ F (U), then #A and #[¬B] are in Gn(U), and #[A → B] is in
G(U), i.e., #[¬A] or #B is in G(U), or equivalently, #A or #[¬B] is in F (U). Thus #A or
#[¬B] is in Gn(U) ∩ F (U). Hence, if (h0) holds, then G
7
n(U) ∩ F (U) = ∅.
#[¬(A↔ B)] cannot be in G8n(U) ∩ F (U), for otherwise both #[A] and #[¬B] or both #[¬A]
and #[B] are in Gn(U), and #[A↔ B] is in G(U), i.e., both #[¬A] and #[¬B] or both #A and
#B are in F (U). Thus one of Go¨del numbers #A, #B, #[¬A] and #[¬B] is in Gn(U)∩F (U),
contradicting with (h0). Thus (h0) implies that G8n(U) ∩ F (U) = ∅.
If #[¬(¬A)] would be in G9n(U) ∩ F (U), then #A would be in Gn(U) and #[¬(¬A)], or equiv-
alently, by (r0), #A would be in F (U), so that #A would be in Gn(U) ∩ F (U). Consequently,
G9n(U) ∩ F (U) = ∅ if (h0) holds.
Because Gn+1(U) = Gn(U) ∪
⋃9
k=1G
k
n(U), the above results imply that Gn+1(U) ∩ F (U) = ∅ if
(h0) holds. Since it holds when n = 0, the above proof shows by induction that it holds for all
n ∈ N0.
If #A is in G(U), it is by (2.5) in Gn(U) for some n ∈ N0. Because (h0) holds, then #A is not
in F (U). Consequently, G(U) ∩ F (U) = ∅.
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Lemma 4.2. If U is a consistent subset of D, then both G(U) and F (U) are consistent.
Proof. If G(U) is not consistent, then there is such a sentence A of L, that #A and #[¬A] are in
G(U). Because #[¬A] is in G(U), then #A is also in F (U) by (3.1), and hence in G(U)∩F (U).
But then, by Lemma 4.1, U is not consistent. Consequently, if U is consistent, then G(U) is
consistent. The proof that F (U) is consistent if U is, is similar.
Lemma 4.3. Assume that U and V are consistent subsets of D, and that U ⊆ V . Then
G(U) ⊆ G(V ) and F (U) ⊆ F (V ).
Proof. Assume that U and V are consistent subsets of D, and that U ⊆ V . Let A be a sentence
of L. By rule (r1) #A is in G(U) and also in G(V ) iff #A is in W .
Let n be a numeral. If #T (n) is in G0(U), then n = ⌈A⌉, where #A is in U . Because U ⊆ V ,
then #A is also in V , whence #T (n) is in G0(V ). If #[¬T (n)] is in G0(U), then n = ⌈A⌉,
where #[¬A] is in U . Because U ⊆ V , then #[¬A] is also in V , whence #[¬T (n)] is in G0(V ).
If #[∃xT (x)] is in G0(U), then U is nonempty. Because U ⊆ V , then also V is nonempty,
whence #[∃xT (x)] is in G0(V ). Consequently, #[∃xT (x)] is in G0(V ) whenever it is in G0(U).
The similar reasoning shows that #[¬(∀x¬T (x))] is in G0(V ) whenever it is in G0(U).
#[∃x¬T (x)] is in G0(U) iff D2(U) is nonempty, i.e., such a sentence A exists in L that #[¬A]
is in U . But then #[¬A] is also in V , i.e., D2(V ) is nonempty, whence #[∃x¬T (x)] is in G0(V ).
Similarly it can be shown that #[¬∀xT (x)] is in G0(V ) whenever it in G0(U).
As consistent sets both U and V are proper subsets of D. Thus the Go¨del numbers #[∀xT (x)],
#[¬(∃x¬T (x)),#[¬∃xT (x)] and #[∀x¬T (x)] are neither in G0(U) nor in G0(V ).
The above results imply that G0(U) ⊆ G0(V ). Make an induction hypothesis:
(h1) Gn(U) ⊆ Gn(V ).
The definitions of the sets Gkn(U), k = 1, . . . , 9, given in (2.3), together with (h1), imply that
Gkn(U) ⊆ G
k
n(V ) for each k = 1, . . . , 9. Thus
Gn+1(U) = Gn(U) ∪
9⋃
k=1
Gkn(U) ⊆ Gn(V ) ∪
9⋃
k=1
Gkn(V ) = Gn+1(V ).
Because (h1) is shown to hold when n = 0, then it holds for every n ∈ N0.
If #A is in G(U), it is by (2.5) in Gn(U) for some n. Thus #A is in Gn(V ) by (h1), and hence
in G(V ). Consequently, G(U) ⊆ G(V ).
If #A is in F (U), it follows from (3.1) that #[¬A] is in G(U). Because G(U) ⊆ G(V ), then
#[¬A] is in G(V ) This implies by (3.1) that #A is in F (V ). Thus F (U) ⊆ F (V ).
Let P denote the family of all consistent subsets of the set D of Go¨del numbers of sentences of
L. According to Lemma 4.2 the mapping G := U 7→ G(U) maps P into P. Assuming that P
is ordered by inclusion, it follows from Lemma 4.3 that G is order preserving.
In the formulation and the proof of Theorem 4.1 below transfinite sequences of P indexed by von
Neumann ordinals are used. Such a sequence (Uλ)λ∈α of P is said to be increasing if Uµ ⊆ Uν
whenever µ ∈ ν ∈ α, and strictly increasing if Uµ ⊂ Uν whenever µ ∈ ν ∈ α.
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Lemma 4.4. Assume that (Uλ)λ∈α a strictly increasing sequence of consistent subsets of D.
Then
(a) (G(Uλ))λ∈α is an increasing sequence of consistent subsets of D.
(b) The set Uα =
⋃
λ∈α
G(Uλ) is consistent.
Proof. (a) Consistency of the sets G(Uλ), λ ∈ α, follows from Lemma 4.2 because the sets Uλ,
λ ∈ α, are consistent.
Because Uµ ⊂ Uν whenever µ ∈ ν ∈ α, then G(Uµ) ⊆ G(Uν) whenever µ ∈ ν ∈ α, by Lemma
4.3, whence the sequence (G(Uλ))λ∈α is increasing. This proves (a).
(b) To prove that the set
⋃
λ∈α
G(Uλ) is consistent, assume on the contrary that there exists such
a sentence A in L that both #A and #[¬A] are in
⋃
λ∈α
G(Uλ). Thus there exist µ, ν ∈ α such
that #A is in G(Uµ) and #[¬A] is in G(Uν). Because G(Uµ) ⊆ G(Uν) or G(Uν) ⊆ G(Uµ), then
both #A and #[¬A] are in G(Uµ) or in G(Uν). But this is impossible, since both G(Uµ) and
G(Uν) are consistent by (a). Thus, the set
⋃
λ∈α
G(Uλ) is consistent, so that the conclusion of (b)
holds.
A subset V of D is called sound if V ⊆ G(V ). Let V be a subset of the set W of Go¨del
numbers of all those sentences of L which are true in the interpretation of L. Since L is an MA
language, then W is consistent. Thus also V is consistent. Because W = G0(∅) ⊂ G(∅), then
V ⊂ G(∅) ⊆ G(V ). Thus V is also sound.
The following fixed point theorem is an application of Lemmas 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4, and is proved
in [4].
Theorem 4.1. If V ∈ P is sound, there exists the smallest of those fixed points of G which
contain V . This fixed point is the last member of the union of those transfinite sequences (Uλ)λ∈α
of P which satisfy
(C) (Uλ)λ∈α is strictly increasing, U0 = V , and if 0 ∈ µ ∈ α, then Uµ =
⋃
λ∈µ
G(Uλ).
The union (Uλ)λ∈γ of the transfinite sequences satisfying (C) can be characterized as follows (cf.
[3]).
(I) U0 = V . If λ is in γ, then λ+ 1 is in γ iff Uλ ⊂ G(Uλ), in which case Uλ+1 = G(Uλ).
If α is a limit ordinal, and λ is in γ for each λ ∈ α, then α is in γ, and Uα =
⋃
λ∈α
Uλ.
It follows from (I) that the sequence (Uλ)λ∈γ begins with sets U0 = V , Un+1 = G(Un), n =
0, 1, . . . , Uω =
⋃
n∈ω
Un, Uω+n+1 = G(Uω+n), n = 0, 1, . . . , e.t.c., as long as the so defined sets exist
and contain strictly previous sets. Because (Uλ)λ∈γ is a strictly increasing sequence of subsets
of a countable set D, then γ is a countable ordinal. In this sense the smallest fixed point of
G that contains V is determined by a countable recursion method. By [5, Corollary 3.1] this
fixed point U is the smallest of all fixed points of G if V is a subset of W . Those sentences of
L whose Go¨del numbers are in U , or equivalently, in G(U), and their negations, whose Go¨del
numbers belong by (r3) to F (U), form an MA language L0 which contains its truth predicate.
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